In this paper, we first give a direct proof of the existence of Edgeworth equilibria for exchange economies with (possibly) unbounded below consumption sets. The key assumption is that the individually rational utility set is compact. It is worth noticing that the statement of this result and its proof do not depend on the dimension or the particular structure of the commodity space. In a second part of the paper, we give conditions in order to decentralize Edgeworth allocations by continuous prices in a finite dimensional and in an infinite dimensional setting. keywords and phrases: arbitrage-free asset markets, individually rational utility set, Edgeworth equilibria, fuzzy coalitions, fuzzy core, Walras equilibria, quasiequilibria, M -properness.
Introduction
Since Hart (1974) [12] , one knows that the existence of equilibrium in exchange economies with unbounded below consumption sets requires some nonarbitrage condition. For exchange economies consisting of a finite number of agents and defined on a finite dimensional commodity space, different variants of such a condition and different concepts of arbitrage have been formulated in [14] , [21] , [13] , [15] , [16] . The relations between these conditions are studied in [7] , [16] , [2] . All in turn imply the compactness of the individually rational utility set 1 when the preferences of agents are derived from utility functions. The few papers dealing with the equilibrium existence in an infinite dimensional setting ( [5] , [4] , [6] , [8] ) assume the compactness of this set. Cheng [5] ,, Chichilnisky and Heal [6] , Dana et al. [8] give also sufficient conditions on the primitives of the economy for this condition to be fulfilled. This nonarbitrage condition is the central assumption of this paper. In order to model asset markets, we consider an exchange economy consisting of m agents, defined on a vector commodity space. Each agent is given with a (possibly unbounded below) consumption set, a utility function representing his preferences on his consumption set, an initial endowment. Our first concern is a direct proof of the existence for such models of Edgeworth equilibria as classically defined by Aliprantis et al. [1] . Since the set of attainable allocations needs not be bounded, this existence cannot be deduced from Debreu and Scarf's theorem or its extensions to an infinite dimensional setting ( [1] and [10] ). However, given the nonarbitrage condition, this existence is guaranteed under mild assumptions stated independently of the dimension of the commodity space or its particular structure.
The proof of this result is based on an extension to fuzzy coalitions of Scarf's theorem on the nonemptiness of the core of a nontransferable utility game game. The arguments of this preliminary result are inspired by a nice paper of Vohra [20] . The notion of balancedness for such a fuzzy game is borrowed from Florenzano [10] . The preliminary result is then applied to a proof (for any integer r) of the nonemptiness of the core of a fuzzy game appropriately associated to the r-replica of the exchange model. Finally, the existence of Edgeworth equilibria is proved using the compactness of the individually rational utility set.
A direct proof of the existence of Edgeworth equilibria open a room for using core-equilibrium equivalence theorems for proving the existence of Walras equilibria. The second part of the paper is devoted to some core-equilibrium equivalence theorems and to their consequences for the existence of Walras equilibria in asset market models.
Recall that the purpose of core-equilibrium equivalence theorems is to show that Edgeworth allocations can be supported as quasiequilibria by continuous prices. While the Edgeworth equilibrium existence theorem does not depend on the dimension and the structure of the commodity space, the techniques for obtaining the decentralizing continuous prices differ very much according to the dimension of the commodity space. In the finite dimensional case, the decentralizing vector price is obtained as a tangent linear functional supporting the set co( i Γ i ) where Γ i is the set of preferred net trades of the ith consumer. The same argument is working in an infinite dimensional setting if the properties of preferred sets allow to use Hahn-Banach's theorem. In both cases, adding the assumptions of the core-equivalence theorem to the assumptions of the Edgeworth equilibrium existence result allow to extend most of known Walras equilibrium existence results.
At the end of the paper, to go further, we assume a vector lattice commodity space with a lattice ordered price space and propose to use a core-equilibrium equivalence result established by Tourky [19] with in mind the possibility of unbounded below consumption sets.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we prove the preliminary result. Section 3 contains the main result of the paper, the Edgeworth equilibrium existence result for an economy with (possibly) unbounded below consumption sets. Section 4 is devoted to decentralization results and to their consequences for the existence of Walras equilibria.
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Consider the following set
It is easily seen that ∆ T is nonempty.
Definition 3.2 A m-person fuzzy game (T , V ) is said to be balanced whenever for every
The following theorem extends Scarf's theorem [17] as stated by Aliprantis et al. [1] . The ideas of the proof are due to R. Vohra [20] (see also Shapley and Vohra [18] ). This section is devoted to its proof.
Theorem 3.1 If T is as above and if (T , V ) is a balanced m-person fuzzy game such that a) each
Proof. Each V (t) is comprehensive from below. So for each t ∈ T , there exists a t ∈ R m such that 0 ∈ int(a t + V (t)). If a = ∨ t∈T a t , it is obvious that a + V satisfies the properties a), b), c), d) and that C(T , a + V ) = a + C(T , V ). Hence, without loss of generality, we can (and we will) assume that 0 ∈ int V (t) for each t ∈ T .
Next, fix some constant c > 0 such that for each t ∈ T and each v ∈ V (t) we have v i < c for all i ∈ supp t, and then consider the set
Clearly, the set W is closed, comprehensive from below and contains 0 in its interior. Let ∂W denote the boundary of W . 
Proof of Claim 3.3 . It suffices to show that f has a closed graph. Let us consider a sequence ( Proof of Claim 3.4. Since f (s) ∈ W , it follows immediately that Ψ(s) is a nonempty subset of ∆. Furthermore, let us assume s n → s, y n → y and y n ∈ Ψ(s n ). Since the range of Ψ is a finite set, there exists some n 0 such that for all n ≥ n 0 , y n = y and f (s
= y} is a finite set, passing to a subsequence if necessary, we can assume that f (s n ) ∈ V (t 0 ) for some t 0 ∈ {t ∈ T | t t 1 = y}. Since f is continuous and V (t 0 ) is a closed set, we deduce that f (s) ∈ V (t 0 ) and consequently y ∈ Ψ(s).
Now we define the function
where, as usual, r + = max{r, 0} for each real number r. Clearly, g is a continuous function. Finally, we consider the correspondence
Note that Φ is nonempty and convex-valued and has a closed graph. Thus by Kakutani's fixed point theorem, Φ has a fixed point (s,μ). That is,
In other words,s
and there exist T ⊂ T , (a t ) t∈T ∈ R T , with a t > 0 ∀t ∈ T and t∈T a t = 1, such thatμ =
Proof of Claim 3.5: Suppose that it is not true. Recalling thatμ ∈ ∆, it follows from (1) that
Clearly, for all j ∈ J we have s j = 0 hence f (s) j = 0. From (2), for all i ∈ I, there exists t ∈ T such that t i > 0, f (s) ∈ V (t), hence f (s) i < c, which, together with J = ∅, contradicts Claim 3.1.
Now, let us consider λ ∈ R
T such that
Clearly t∈T λ t t =1, and therefore λ ∈ ∆ T .
Claim 3.6 f (s) ∈ C(T , V )
Proof of Claim 3.6:
Hence f (s) ∈ V (1). Suppose that there exists t ∈ T and v ∈ V (t) such that f (s) i < v i for all i ∈ supp t. Let u be such that u i = v i for all i ∈ supp t and u i = c otherwise. It follows from Property
, which ends the proof of theorem 3.1.
Application to the existence of Edgeworth equi-
libria of an arbitrage-free exchange economy
Definitions
In order to apply the previous theorem, we consider an exchange economy defined on a commodity vector space L and recall some definitions. M = {1, . . . , m} is the set of consumers. Each consumer i is described by a consumption set X i ⊂ L, an initial endowment e i ∈ X i , and a preference relation which is represented by a utility function u i : X i → R. We normalize the utility functions by requiring u i (e i ) = 0. To summarize, the economy E is a collection
Let A(E) be the set of all attainable allocations of the economy E, that is:
Let also M = 2 M \ {∅} be the family of all coalitions of consumers. The allocation x ∈ A(E) is improved upon by the coalition S ∈ M if there exists (x i ) i∈S ∈ i∈S X i satisfying i∈S x i = i∈S e i and such that u i (x i ) < u i (x i ) for every i ∈ S. The core of the economy E, denoted by C(E), is defined as the set of all allocations x ∈ A(E) which are improved upon by no coalition. Finally, following Aliprantis et al. [1] , x ∈ A(E) is said to be an Edgeworth equilibrium if, for every integer r ≥ 1, the r-repetition of x belongs to the core of the r-fold replica of E. We will denote by C E (E) the set of all Edgeworth equilibria of E.
For each integer r ≥ 1, using the notations of the previous section, if
let us define C r (E) as the set of all attainable allocations x ∈ A(E) such that there exist no t ∈ T r and no x t ∈ i∈supp t X i such that i∈supp t
As it is easily seen and proved in Florenzano [10] , under convexity assumptions on preferences and consumption sets, C E (E) = r≥1 C r (E). In other words, C E (E) is the set of all x ∈ A(E) such that there exist no t = (t i ) i∈M ∈ T , with rational rates of participation, and no x t ∈ i∈supp t X i such that i∈supp t
Following Aubin [3] , the fuzzy core of the economy E, C F (E), is the set of all x ∈ A(E) such that there exist no t = (t i ) i∈M ∈ T and no x t ∈ i∈supp t X i such that i∈supp t
The existence result
Let us now denote by
the individually rational utility set 2 .
We make on E the following assumptions:
For a fuzzy coalition t ∈ T r , let
We will keep in mind that To this end, let λ ∈ ∆ T r and v ∈ {t∈T r |λt>0} V c (t). For each integer n and for every t ∈ T r such that λ t > 0, there exists
For
Since t∈T r λ t t =1, we have for
which shows that xRemark 4.1 Adding the assumption that the commodity space is finite dimensional, the consumption sets are closed and the utility functions are upper semicontinuous at every attainable consumption vector to the other assumptions of Theorem 4.1, it would be easy to deduce its conclusion from Proposition 3 in Florenzano [10] . The same proof 3 , under analogous topological assumptions (relative to the weak * -topology on L), can be given if the commodity space is an infinite dimensional Banach space which has a predual. These two cases cover most of commodity spaces of economic interest. However, it should be noticed that the statement of Theorem 4.1 and its proof do not depend on the dimension of the commodity space or on its particular structure.
Remark 4.2 As easily seen and proved in Florenzano [10] , if the commodity space L is a Hausdorff topological vector space and if the utility functions are lower semicontinuous at every attainable consumption vector, an Edgeworth equilibrium whose existence is proved in Theorem 4.1 is actually an element of the fuzzy core, C F (E), of the economy E.
Walras equilibria of an arbitrage-free exchange economy
Recall that a couple (x, p) is said to be a quasiequilibrium of E iff x ∈ A(E), p is a linear functional on L, with p = 0 and
Walras equilibrium. We will prove the existence of quasiequilibria by decentralizing Edgeworth equilibria obtained via Theorem 4.1.
Finite dimensional decentralization
Let us first assume that the commodity space L is R , the l dimensional space.
For each x i ∈ X i , we define the strictly preferred set to x i by
and we set the two following assumptions: [A.4] For each i ∈ M , u i is lower semicontinuous at every attainable consumption vector;
. G is nonempty since x ∈ A(E) and the assumption [A.5] imply that P i (x i ) = ∅. We first prove that 0 / ∈ G. Indeed if not, there exists λ = (λ i ) i∈M such that λ i ≥ 0, for all i and i∈M λ i = 1 and (
Thus the fuzzy coalition λimprove uponx, which contradictsx ∈ C F (E). Now, by the separation theorem for finite dimensional vector spaces, there
Thus p ·x i = p · e i for all i ∈ M and (x, p) is a quasi-equilibrium of E.
Remark 5.1 In view of [A.5] , assuming either that each e i ∈ int X i or that e = i∈M e i is an interior point of i∈M X i and that E satisfies some irreducibility assumption, then (x, p) is a Walras equilibrium.
Infinite dimensional decentralization
If the commodity space, L, is infinite dimensional, let us first assume that L is a Hausdorff topological vector space and that int( i∈M (P i (x i ) − e i )) = ∅. Using Hahn-Banach's theorem, we can mimic the proof of Proposition 5.1 in order to obtain: To go further, we now assume that L is a vector lattice with a topological dual which is a sublattice of its order dual. We restrict ourselves in this last part of the paper to the case of a noncompact attainable set, A(E). The reader can find a study of the case A(E) compact in Deghdak and Florenzano [9] for consumption sets equal to the positive cone and in Florenzano and Marakulin [11] for more general consumption sets (see also the references quoted in both papers). Recall that e = i∈M e i and that P i (x i ) = {x i ∈ X i | u i (x i ) < u i (x i )} defines a preference correspondence (preference relation) P i : X i → X i . The following definition is borrowed from Tourky [19] 
